Do Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policies Cover Bodily Injury and Property Damage Caused by Hazardous Waste Disposal? Montrose Chemical Corporation of California v. Admiral Insurance Company by Richie, Steven L.
Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal
Volume 8 | Issue 2 Article 9
January 1992
Do Comprehensive General Liability Insurance
Policies Cover Bodily Injury and Property Damage
Caused by Hazardous Waste Disposal? Montrose
Chemical Corporation of California v. Admiral
Insurance Company
Steven L. Richie
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj
Part of the Law Commons
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Steven L. Richie, Do Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policies Cover Bodily Injury and Property Damage Caused by Hazardous
Waste Disposal? Montrose Chemical Corporation of California v. Admiral Insurance Company, 8 Santa Clara High Tech. L.J. 507
(1992).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol8/iss2/9
CASENOTE
DO COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY
INSURANCE POLICIES COVER BODILY INJURY AND
PROPERTY DAMAGE CAUSED BY HAZARDOUS WASTE
DISPOSAL? Montrose Chemical Corporation of California v.
Admiral Insurance Company, 3 Cal. App. 4th 1511, 5 Cal. Rptr.
2d 358 (Cal. Ct. App., 2d Dist., Feb. 27, 1992)*
Steven L. Richiet
INTRODUCTION
On February 27, 1992, the California Court of Appeal, Second
Appellate District, held that all bodily injuries and property dam-
age, which are continuous and progressive throughout successive
policy periods,' are covered by all comprehensive general liability
(CGL) insurance policies in effect during those periods.2 The case
is the first opinion in California deciding the issue of which trigger
of coverage3 should be used in cases involving third party4 insur-
Copyright 0 1992 by Steven L. Richie.
* On May 21, 1992 the California Supreme Court granted certiorari for this case by a
4 to 3 vote. Two subsequent California Appellate Court cases are expected to be heard at the
same time. These are Pines of La Jolla Homeowners Assn. v. Industrial Indemnity, 7 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 53 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992), which, unlike Montrose, decided in favor of the insurer, and
Stonewall Insurance Co. v. City of Palos Verdes Estates, 92 C.D.O.S. 4209 (2nd Dist. May
15, 1992), which followed Montrose and held for the insured.
t Candidate, J.D. 1993, Santa Clara University School of Law; B.A. 1990, University
of California at Santa Cruz.
1. Policy periods are generally one year long. Every year the insured must get a new
policy and is free to choose a different insurance company.
2. Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 360 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992).
3. "Triggers of coverage" are tests that courts apply to determine whether a discharge
of pollutants is covered by an insurance policy. A court determines whether a discharge
constitutes an "occurrence," as defined in an insurance policy, and then it decides whether
that discharge happened at a time covered by the policy, thus "triggering" the liability of the
insurance company to the insured.
For instance, under the "manifestation of loss" trigger, coverage is triggered only for the
policy in effect at the time when appreciable damage occurs and is or should be known to a
reasonable insured.
Under the "continuous injury" trigger, for which Montrose argued and which the court
adopted, the timing of the cause of the damage (the insured's negligent act) and the date the
damage manifested are not relevant. It is only the effects of the discharge that matter. If
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ance policies.' In finding that coverage should be provided, the
court adopted the "continuous injury" trigger,6 rather than the
"manifestation of loss" trigger, for determining which CGL policies
cover third party claims of property damage and bodily injury.7
Additionally, the court decided that an insured's knowledge of
environmental contamination problems on a site does not preclude
insurance coverage for third party claims arising from those
problems. The court applied a strict application of the "known
loss" doctrine.9
This case expands the liability of insurance companies under
CGL policies for insureds' environmental problems.
BACKGROUND
Insurance company liability for environmental costs began
when courts ruled that insureds were entitled to reimbursement of
cleanup costs arising under the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA).1° The
Supreme Court of California held that cleanup costs constituted
damages under the policy, and therefore were recoverable by an in-
sured." The Court also considered which policies provided cover-
age in the first party claim context and adopted the "manifestation
these effects are continuous or progressive over successive policy periods, coverage is trig-
gered under all the policies in effect during those periods.
4. A third party policy provides coverage for liability of the insured to another. A
CGL policy is a third party policy. A first party policy provides coverage for loss or damage
sustained by the insured. Examples of first party policies would be fire, life, health or disabil-
ity insurance. 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 363-4 n. 9.
5. Insurance Companies Must Provide Broad Coverage for Damages Resulting From
Hazardous Waste, State Appellate Court Rules, PR Newswire Assn., Inc., Mar. 4, 1992, avail-
able in LEXIS, Environmental Library, Publications Directory [hereinafter PR Newswire].
6. The "continuous injury" trigger is sometimes referred to as the "triple trigger."
This is because it is a combination of three more restrictive triggers. These are:
(1) The Exposure Trigger - Coverage is triggered at the time of the release of
pollutants, regardless of the time of discovery.
(2) The Manifestation of Loss Trigger - Coverage is triggered at the time
when appreciable damage occurs and is or should be known to a reasonable
insured.
(3) The Discovery Trigger - Coverage is triggered when the injury is
discovered.
7. 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 369.
8. Id. at 370.
9. This doctrine provides that when a loss is known or apparent to the insured before
the issuance of an insurance policy, there is no coverage under that policy. Id. at 370.
10. Scott D. Patterson & Paul M. Hummer, An Ounce of Prevention: Comprehensive
General Liability Insurance Coverage for 'Preventive' Expenses at Superfund Sites, Env't Rep.
(BNA), Apr. 12, 1991, at 2239.
11. AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 799 P.2d 1253 (Cal. 1990).
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of loss" trigger.12 The court did not rule on coverage in the third
party claim context since that issue was not before them.13 The
Montrose court resolves the issue of when liability arises the the
context of third party environmental claims. The Montrose opinion
does not address the applicability of pollution exclusion clauses, 4
but a brief background on the issue is warranted.
Pollution exclusions are not absolute."5 Some courts have held
that coverage is required, regardless of the pollution exclusion,
where the bodily injury or property damage results from a dis-
charge of pollutants that is "sudden and accidental."1 6 California
courts have not directly addressed the applicability of the pollution
12. Prudential-LMI Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct., 798 P.2d 1230, 1247 (Cal. 1990).
13. Id. at 1246.
14. The standard CGL policy contains an exclusionary clause, known as the "pollution
exclusion," which disclaims coverage "for bodily injury or property damage arising out of the
discharge, dispersal, release or escape" of pollutants.
15. Wary of the potential exposure that they had from the classic pollution exclusion,
the insurance industry created an "iron clad" pollution exclusion in 1986. Many policies now
contain this exclusion, which typically provides:
This insurance does not apply to...
(1) 'Bodily injury' or 'property damage' arising out of the actual, al-
leged, or threatened discharge, dispersal, release or excape of
pollutants:
(a) At or from premises you own, rent or occupy;
(b) At or from any site or location used by or for you or other for
the handling, storage, disposal, processing or treatment of
waste;
(c) Which are at any time transported, handled, stored, treated,
disposed of, or processed as waste by or for you or any person
or organization for whom you may be legally responsible; or
(d) At or from any site or location on which you or any contractors
or subcontractors working directly or indirectly on your behalf
are performing operations:
(i) if the pollutants are brought on or to the site or location in
connection with such operations;
(ii) if the operations are to test for, monitor, clean up, remove,
contain, treat, detoxify or neutralize the pollutants.
(2) Any loss, cost or expense arising out of any governmental direction
or request that you test for, monitor, clean up, remove, contain,
treat, detoxify or neutralize pollutants. 'Pollutants' means any solid,
liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke,
vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste. Waste in-
cludes materials to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed. "Sub-
paragraphs (a) and (d)(i) of paragraph (1) of this exclusion do ot
apply to 'bodily injury' or 'property damage' caused by heat, smoke
or fumes from a hostile fire. As used in this exclusion, a hostile fire
means one which becomes uncontrollable or breaks out from where
it was intended to be.
16. See, eg., New Castle County v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1167
(3d Cir. 1991).
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNL [
exclusion, but many contradictory opinions have been issued in
other jurisdictions.1 7 For instance, some courts have interpreted
"sudden and accidental" to mean "unexpected and unintended,"1"
while others have interpreted the phrase more narrowly by adopting
a temporal interpretation that requires the discharge to be abrupt.1 9
FACTS
Montrose is a defunct chemical company that manufactured
DDT for use in pesticides from 1947 until 1982. Since 1960, seven
different insurance companies had issued CGL policies to Mont-
rose. The latest carrier, Admiral Insurance Company, issued four
separate CGL policies to Montrose covering the period from Octo-
ber 13, 1982 to March 20, 1986. These policies obligate Admiral to
"pay on behalf of [Montrose] all sums which [Montrose] shall be-
come legally obligated to pay as damages because of. . . bodily
injury, or... property damage to which this insurance applies,
caused by an occurrence...." 20 This is the language generally used
in contemporary liability policies.2"
There are five separate actions pending against Montrose. All
five actions allege property damage, and one alleges bodily injuries,
from sites where Montrose manufactured its DDT or disposed of its
hazardous waste.22 There are two different sites involved, but all of
the claims allege damage occurring from either 1947 or 1956 to the
present.23 Chemical use on the properties stopped in 1964 or 1965
on one site and in 1972 on the other. The damages were allegedly
caused by the ongoing actions of chemicals released during periods
prior to these dates.
Montrose requested a defense for these actions from its seven
CGL carriers, including Admiral, and all but one agreed to defend
17. 11 MARK S. RHODES, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 44A:122 (1982 and Supp. 1991).
18. See Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 380 S.E.2d 686 (Ga. 1989).
19. See Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. Belleville Indus., 55 N.E.2d 568 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1990).
20. Supra note 2 at 363. "Occurrence" is defined as "an accident, including continuous
or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or property damage neither
expected nor intended from the standpoint of Montrose." Id.
21. 11 MARK S. RHODES, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 44:285 (1982 and Supp. 1991).
22. These actions consist of the following: 1) a cost reimbursement action for cleanup
pursuant to CERCLA; 2) a natural resources damage action under CERCLA; 3) a private
party toxic tort action for property damage and personal injuries; and 4) private actions for
fraud and indemnity for the sale of a contaminated property. Supra note 2 at 360-2.
23. The two sites involved are the Stringfellow Acid Pits in Riverside County and the
United Heckathorn site in Contra Costa County. Id. at 360-1.
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subject to a reservations of rights.2 4 In 1986, Montrose sued the
carriers, seeking a declaration that they had a duty to both defend
and indemnify in all five actions. In 1989, Admiral filed motions for
summary judgment and summary adjudication of issues asking the
court to find that it had no duty to defend. Admiral's motion for
summary judgment was granted and this appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Reasonable Expectations
Due to the "bewildering plethora of authority which has devel-
oped over the last few years"25 the Montrose court could not look to
other jurisdictions for help in deciding this issue.26 For its analysis,
the Montrose court applied the same factors that the California
Supreme Court used in the Prudential-LMI case on first party pol-
icy coverage.
The Prudential-LMI court articulated three reasons for sup-
porting application of the manifestation of loss rule in the first party
context. First, "the reasonable expectations of the insureds are met
because they look to their present carrier for coverage. ' 27 Second,
"the underwriting practices of the insurer can be made predictable
because the insurer is not liable for a loss once its contract with the
insured ends, unless the manifestation of loss occurred during its
contract term."28 Third, since the insured is required under a stan-
dard first party policy to file suit against the insurer within twelve
months after "inception of the loss," and since in that context "in-
ception of the loss" means the date on which appreciable damage
occurs and is or should be known to the insured, in effect the defini-
tion of "manifestation of loss" must be the same as the definition of
"inception of the loss.' '29 The key to Montrose is the distinction
between first party and third party claims.30 The court took the
same three factors and applied them to the third party claim situa-
tion. Unlike the Prudential LMI case, the court held that the "con-
tinuous injury" trigger, rather than the "manifestation of loss"
trigger, should apply.
24. The insurance companies reserved the right to deny their duty to provide a defense
or indemnify Montrose in the event of liability at any time.
25. Gottlieb v. Newark Ins. Co., 570 A.2d 443, 445 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
26. 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 363.
27. 798 P.2d at 1246.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1236.
30. For definitions of first and third party policies, see supra note 4.
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First, the court found in the third party context that it was
reasonable for an insured to expect coverage under more than one
policy for continuous and progressive bodily injuries and property
damage."a In this context, the insured will not receive a windfall,
but all carriers will be required to pay their fair share of the liability
as determined by policy language or the court applying equitable
considerations.32
Second, the court found that underwriting can never be pre-
dictable in third party claims, as opposed to first party claims where
there will be a cap, such as the value of a building with fire insur-
ance. The court explained, "Third party coverage differs substan-
tially. At best, the insured makes an educated guess about its
potential exposure to third parties. At worst, the insured's best
guess falls far short of the mark. It is natural, therefore, for an
insured to anticipate coverage under more than one policy."t33
Third, the court noted that the statute of limitations for third
party policies is four years from the date of final judgement against
the insured and that there is no "inception of loss" language in a
standard CGL policy, so there is "no corollary need to apply the
definition of 'loss' articulated in Prudential-LMI.' '34
The court in Montrose did not end its analysis after applying
the factors from Prudential-LMI. In its decision to adopt the "con-
tinuous injury" trigger in third party claims, the court also consid-
ered two additional factors from the insurance industry. First, it
considered an alternative type of policy available from insurance
companies which is referred to as a "claims made" policy. This
type of policy was developed to limit a carrier's risk by restricting
coverage to the single policy in effect at the time a claim was as-
serted against the insured. The court found that to adopt the "man-
ifestation of loss" trigger for coverage would in effect convert the
"occurrence" policy that Montrose had into a "claims made" pol-
icy.35 The only way that a third party claim can manifest itself is
when it is asserted against the insured.
The last factor the court considered was the information from
the insurance industry related to the change in CGL policies from
31. In the first party context, based on insureds' reasonable expectations, there is no
reason for an insured to look to more than one policy since the insured has usually purchased
insurance in an amount sufficient to cover his maximum potential loss. Supra note 2 at 366.
32. The liability for the insurance companies will be joint and several unless the court,
in its discretion, decides that a different apportionment would be more equitable. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 367.
35. Id. at 367-8.
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the term "accident" to the term "occurrence". Admiral argued to
the court that Montrose's interpretation of the policy and applica-
tion of the "continuous injury" trigger were unreasonable. The
court looked at comments made by the Secretary of the National
Bureau of Casualty Underwriters regarding the change in language.
These comments indicated that coverage could be triggered under
multiple policies for continuing injuries. The court thus held that
Admiral cannot now deny that Montrose's interpretation is reason-
able since it was predicted by the insurance industry.36
Known Loss
Admiral responded that because of Montrose's knowledge of
the environmental contamination problems at one of the sites, cov-
erage should be denied.37 The Santa Ana Regional Water Quality
Control Board had declared the Stringfellow site to be a public nui-
sance in 197538 and the Environmental Protection Agency had noti-
fied Montrose that it considered Montrose a potentially responsible
party for money expended for response activities at the site.39 The
court rejected Admiral's argument and decided that Montrose's
knowledge was not sufficient to preclude coverage. 40 The court
held that more specific knowledge would be required to invoke the
"known loss" doctrine. Section 250 of the insurance policy pro-
vided that "any contingent or unknown event, whether past or fu-
ture, which may damnify a person having an insurable interest or
create a liability against him, may be insured against." The court
relied on this language to determine that "all that is required is that
there be some contingency and, however inevitable an event might
be, an 'inevitable' event is still a contingency or risk within the
meaning of" section 250.41
The court did emphasize that this holding did not mean that
parties to a lawsuit could obtain insurance that would cover their
present case. First, the court said its holding was "simply that
where, as here, the insured is under no legal obligation to pay and
36. Id. at 368-9.
37. This argument is based on the "known loss" doctrine and the wording of the policy
in question. For an explanation of the "known loss" doctrine, see supra note 9. Section 22 of
the insurance policy in question defines "insurance" as a "contract whereby one undertakes
to indemnify another against loss, damage, or liability arising from a contingent or unknown
event."
38. 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 361.
39. Id. at 362.
40. Id. at 370-1.
41. Id. at 370.
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no lawsuits were filed at the time the policies were purchased, there
is an insurable risk."' 2 The court also provided that "[a]n insured
must make all required disclosures at the time it applies for cover-
age and the fact that the 'known loss' rule does not defeat coverage
has nothing to do with issues of fraudulent concealment. '4 3
EXPANDING LIABILITY FOR INSURANCE COMPANIES
Since the interpretation of the pollution exclusion that Califor-
nia adopts will possibly be quite narrow, Montrose is a great victory
for policyholders, as it will greatly increase their chances for the
recovery of damages for environmental claims. While the policy in
effect at the time a loss manifests may have contained a pollution
exclusion, all other policies in effect during the creation of the haz-
ard will also be considered. Some policies will probably not contain
the exclusion and will thus have to cover the policyholder's claim.'
In fact, this scenario happened in Montrose where the court re-
quired that all of the CGL policies that Admiral had issued to
Montrose were to be considered as potentially providing coverage.4"
Admiral only asserted the pollution exclusion as a defense for one
of those four policies.46
This ruling will also make insurance companies take the claims
of their insureds more seriously. Insurance companies "had used
the lack of a decisive legal ruling to deny coverage to many Califor-
nia companies confronted with lawsuits brought by environmental
regulators and others."'47 Many will now be forced to defend and
indemnify an insured that may have been denied coverage prior to
this decision.
CONCLUSION
In many environmental contamination cases, the person re-
sponsible for the contamination is out of business or bankrupt.
David Mulliken, attorney for Montrose, said, "This decision will
release literally billions of dollars from insurance carrier coffers and
42. Id. at 371.
43. Id.
44. The insured will still have to prove that there was an occurrence during a policy
period, which could be difficult for old policies. Also, insureds often throw away policies as
they expire. If the insured does not have his original paperwork, the insurance company will
not provide coverage.
45. 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 360.
46. Id. at 369.
47. Michael Parrish, Insurers May Pay for More Toxic Cleanups, L.A. TIMEs, March 5,
1992, at D2.
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allow a needed response to environmental claims."4 8 This is true in
more ways than one. There will be more money available to reim-
burse the government when it performs the clean up and then
brings a cost recovery action for its expenses. There will also be
more money available for people injured by the contamination,
either directly with personal injuries, or indirectly through property
damages.
Insurance companies will now have to convert their CGL poli-
cies to include the "iron clad" pollution exclusion49 to avoid liabil-
ity for environmental claims. For now, though, many old policies
issued by a company will still cover claims under Montrose and it
will be a long time before they can all be forgotten. The resulting
effect will be that insurance companies will raise their premiums
and sell other forms of insurance, such as Environmental Impair-
ment Liability or Property Policies, along with standard Compre-
hensive General Liability policies.
48. PR Newswire, supra note 5.
49. See supra note 15.
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